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Raising the Bar:
Organizing Capacity in 2009 and Beyond
A Report for the Neighborhood Funders Group
Richard L. Wood
University of New Mexico
Efforts to reshape the life opportunities for working families in America face a critical juncture
in 2009 and beyond, involving both new opportunities and new challenges. This critical juncture
arises due to two recent changes. First, 2008 brought important changes in national political
dynamics as a result of the economic meltdown and the election of President Barack Obama and
a new Congress. Second, internal dynamics within community organizing efforts in poor,
working-class and middle-class communities have changed, with significant progress made over
the last decade in re-engaging working families in the political process. This report uses the
recent experience of two projects – different models for mobilizing working families for civic
engagement on policy reform – as a lens to explore the broader dynamics of community
organizing today. Ultimately, it argues that these dynamics present a strategic window of
opportunity for those dedicated to advancing the interests of working families in the United
States.
Political context: Instability of national political dynamics
Local community organizers increasingly recognize the need to project power into state- and
national-level political arenas. Though significant decisions about the quality-of-life issues that
are the bread and butter of local organizing – public education, working-class wages, law
enforcement, affordable housing – are still often made by local authorities, those decisions are
often deeply constrained by policy and funding decisions made by state and national authorities
(the No Child Left Behind law being one dramatic example). And on particular issues crucial to
working families – healthcare and immigration among them – meaningful policy change
virtually has to come from national or state political arenas. As I’ve noted elsewhere:
Changes in the national culture and political economy have reshaped the ecology
of civic engagement in ways that present new challenges. Deindustrialization of
the American economy, and the de-localization of many of the corporations that
remain in cities, virtually require community organizing to project power into
higher-level political arenas if they wish to have real impact. But meanwhile the
political and cultural bases from which to build such civic power have themselves
been eroded: on one hand by a new hyper-partisanship in Congress and national
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politics; and on the other hand by the decline of a culture of civic engagement in
American life.1
Part of that 2007 analysis has become even more relevant since the financial implosion and
economic downturn of late 2008. America in 2009 and beyond will face extreme economic
challenges. The question is whether the spike in civic engagement during the 2008 election cycle
can be channeled into renewing our cultural and political resources to confront the nation’s
challenges. That is, the fact that American public policy needs to better reflect the necessities and
priorities of working families does not mean that we have the political capacity to do so
successfully. If that point is not obvious, one need only cite the struggle in early 2009 to produce
meaningful economic stimulus or financial rescue policy, and the failure in 2007-2008 to
effectively address the crises in healthcare and immigration policy. On many fronts where
progressive policy change has looked possible in recent years, our divided national polity has
essentially been paralyzed by a combination of factors: recalcitrant congressional minorities, a
party system indebted to lobbyists who seek to kill any legislation that threatens their interests,
and a widespread grassroots political culture suspicious of government programs as a solution to
virtually any social problem.
Yet change can be detected on some fronts. The 2008 Democratic campaign mobilized
unprecedented grassroots involvement (and money), driven initially by the compelling duel
between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama and later by enthusiastic support for Obama, whose
operation was built on community organizing tactics. Now Congress and President Obama are
under pressure to bring about real improvement in the lives of Americans and to provide
concrete evidence that a new, more constructive political wind is blowing in national politics.
Americans increasingly affirm that government must step in to address the current challenges.
The long bleeding in Iraq may be coming to an end.
Thus, political leaders will face both pressure and opportunities to act aggressively – either
through bipartisan agreement or through assertion of a new direction by the president and the
Democratic congressional majority. But given the continuing partisan cross-currents in Congress
and the caution of politicians wary of losing the next election, assertive policy-making to serve a
progressive agenda is unlikely without (small-d) democratic pressure from below.
So the emerging national political context looks likely to offer an opportunity for progressive
policy change. The key to exploiting that opening – and not squandering it – may lie in bringing
sufficient pressure to bear from the local level. Absent such pressure, the political process may
well stagnate anew. The rest of this brief argues that community organizing – at least its more
sophisticated versions – has recently developed the capacity to be a significant force in
generating pressure at the state and national levels.
1

See “Higher Power: Strategic Capacity for State and National Organizing” by Richard L.
Wood in Transforming the City: Community Organizing and the Challenge of Political Change,
edited by Marion Orr (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2007).
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Organizing capacity: The challenge
Efforts to build democratic movements in America have gained attention over the past decade.2
Many analysts have promoted a cautiously optimistic reading of the prospects for democratic
reform. But they focus on local movements, and thus beg the question: When so much of the
decision-making that determines the quality of life for poor, working-class and middle-class
Americans occurs “over the heads” of local political leaders, how influential can locally rooted
social movements be? Are they relegated to fiddling on the margins of social policy – perhaps
extracting minor concessions, but powerless to affect the decisions of national political elites
whose policies determine the availability of societal resources, or the state-level elites who
distribute those resources? Together, these state- and national-level decisions severely constrain
local options. Can community organizing effectively overcome those constraints?
On first glimpse, little in the history of community organizing as it is usually conceived suggests
a positive answer. Its bread and butter – at least in the strand of organizing descended from Saul
Alinksy – has always been gaining local improvements by fighting (and sometimes working in
partnership with) local authorities. From the 1940s through the 1990s, the significant organizing
wins came primarily at this level.
Yet this is too narrow a lens to assess the higher-level strategic potential of community
organizing, for two reasons. First, a few organizing efforts in that period did successfully project
power into higher-level political arenas. The Texas Industrial Areas Foundation, for example,
had important success in transforming that state’s public-education policy and influencing other
statewide policies (at least until the nearly complete Republican takeover of state politics). The
Gamaliel Foundation invoked a sophisticated analysis of regional economic flows to produce
some policy change beyond the metropolitan level in several Midwestern cities. And PICO
California (formerly the PICO California Project, discussed below) continues to link 18
organizations of the PICO National Network to gain a prominent voice in the policy process in
that largest of state political arenas. Second, many of the most important and powerful
democratic movements in American history – though not commonly considered instances of
“community organizing” – in fact were built upon community organizing foundations. One
example may suffice: The Civil Rights movement emerged as a national phenomenon only after
many years of organizing and institution-building at the local level, especially through local
churches and clergy councils. By itself, in the absence of a national strategy and structure, local
community organizing could never have achieved the historic progress of the Civil Rights
movement. But without such local community organizing, that national movement would have
been stillborn.
With all that in mind, this paper adopts a clear-eyed realism in noting the difficulties confronting
2
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any effort to project national power from a base in local community organizing – and at the same
time argues that we should advance that possibility where it exists. In that combination lies the
audacity of realistic, strategic hope.
Confronting strategic challenges
To take advantage of emerging political opportunities and successfully overcome the political
challenges it faces, community organizing (like other kinds of social movements) must combine
mobilizing capacity and strategic capacity.3 In the past, funders, scholars and organizers
themselves have often paid greater attention to mobilizing capacity, i.e., how successfully an
organization can turn out people to pressure government officials to implement egalitarian
policies. This is often spoken of as “using the power of people to counterbalance the power of
money in political life.” This is indeed a key item in the toolkit of community organizations, the
force behind most of their attempts to change public policy. But the efficacy of an organization’s
mobilizing capacity can be reduced or multiplied by its strategic creativity. By this I do not mean
creativity for its own sake. Strategic capacity is the ability to innovate in the face of changing
political circumstances and adapt the organization’s strategy and tactics as required. An
organization with high strategic capacity can adapt its actions to take maximum advantage of its
mobilizing capacity, even when the latter is low. When both strategic capacity and mobilizing
capacity are high, public-policy impact becomes far more feasible. As I will show below, the
very strongest organizing efforts today have begun to combine both types of capacity in
promising ways.
Marshall Ganz shows that strategic capacity is the product of two sets of factors, grouped under
“leadership” and “organization.” Strategic capacity is strengthened if the movement includes:
 leaders who mix strong and weak ties within and outside the movement;
 both political insiders and political outsiders;
 and leaders whose past political work gives them experience of diverse tactics, thus
creating alternative political possibilities.
Likewise, strategic capacity is strengthened if the movement organization:
 includes structures for deliberation and decision-making that are open and authoritative;
 draws on resources (both money and people’s talents) that come from multiple
constituencies, including the groups they are trying to mobilize;
3
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fosters creative decision-making;
and fosters accountability to keep leaders tied to the interests of constituents (in
community organizing, usually identified as “working families”).

Integrating the insights of a variety of scholars and practitioners of political organizing, we can
say that underlying both strategic capacity and mobilizing capacity are the culture and structure
adopted by a social movement or community organization as it strives to change public policy.
The table below summarizes those insights regarding how culture and structure combine to
produce strong strategic capacity to confront political challenges.
TABLE: Organizational, Leadership and Cultural Factors Contributing to Strategic
Capacity4
Organizational Factors
Deliberative structure:
Resource flows:
Accountability:
Organizational structure:
External networks:
Internal networks:

Leadership Factors
Leaders’ biographies:
Repertoires:

Regular, open, authoritative; creative decision-making
Money and people from multiple constituencies, including base
Entrepreneurial or democratic accountability
Federated (local-state-federal) organizational structure
Mix of strong and weak ties to diverse external institutions
Mix of strong and weak ties among organizing participants; for action at
state/national levels, must build “weak ties” across localities

Mix of insiders/outsiders
Key leaders bring mix of political repertoires

Cultural Factors
Internal politics:
Promotion of unity; effective undermining of factionalism
Internal communication: Extensive reciprocal communication, including communication regarding
participant “feeling”; some one-way communication
Monitoring:
Regular assessment of participants’ action thresholds
Meaning construction:
Shared interpretation of the meaning of organizing

These, then, are the kinds of attributes community organizations must bring together if they hope
to generate the strategic capacity to take advantage of emerging political dynamics and have an
impact on policy. To make the resulting political strategy effective, they must also build
sufficient mobilizing capacity to be taken seriously in high-level political arenas. There is no
easy formula for this. Rather, herein lies the art of political organizing: constructing
4
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organizations with the cultural, strategic and mobilizing abilities required to exploit the limited
political openings that exist at any given time and create new ones where possible. Herein, too,
lies the art of strategic funding: identifying organizing efforts that possess those abilities and
assuring they have the resources and strategic vision to meet the current challenge.
I now want to explore some of the things one might look for when identifying such efforts, using
the “strategic capacity” framework to analyze case studies from two organizing models.

Virginia Organizing Project: Strategic creativity in action
The Virginia Organizing Project (VOP) provides an example of sophisticated strategic capacity
within an organization that is not well-known nationally. VOP was founded in 1995 as “a
statewide grassroots organization dedicated to challenging injustice by empowering people in
local communities to address issues that affect the quality of their lives.” Because it does not
mobilize through established institutions (like the congregations at the heart of the “faith-based”
organizing to be discussed below), VOP does not have the mobilizing capacity to turn out many
hundreds or thousands of people for political actions. Instead, it combines different organizing
tactics creatively, to gain greater political leverage than its limited mobilizing capacity would
otherwise allow. By heightening its strategic capacity through years of innovative work, VOP
has slowly gained a voice in statewide policy in Virginia.
VOP’s innovative qualities can be seen in everything from its internal structure to its organizing
efforts. With a staff of only 15 (five in the central office, 10 as regional organizers), the project is
building statewide political capacity in a state with nearly 8 million residents. It does so by
tapping into staff talent from more than a dozen statewide groups that are VOP’s coalition
partners on various issue campaigns, and from some 45 other agencies and organizations around
the state. The latter agencies vary from environmental projects to children’s service efforts to
advocacy organizations and beyond. VOP built relationships with this second set of
organizations by serving as a traditional fiscal sponsor for them. But these relationships
transcend typical voluntary-sector affiliations. As VOP Executive Director Joe Szakos notes,
“The relationship does not just let us be their bank, but gives both sides the opportunity to
borrow and share power.”
How do they “borrow and share power”? One of VOP’s key new organizing tactics is canvassing
campaigns that blanket a particular elected official’s district to learn voter’s concerns and
desires. This gives the organization real leverage with officials, who often struggle to stay
informed about what is going on in their constituents’ lives. But canvassing is also highly laborintensive. On a small budget and without massive numbers of volunteers, this tactic would be
impossible. VOP periodically draws on staff, members, interns or other representatives from its
partner organizations who are interested in a particular campaign, as well as from its statewide
coalition partners. This tactic has allowed VOP to regularly carry out impressive canvassing
efforts, such as its summer 2008 effort to knock on more than 140,000 doors through its “Civic
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Engagement Project.”
After the canvassing campaign, a small group of VOP leaders and members may meet with the
official. When they do, they are well-prepared through careful background research in
collaboration with partner organizations, and well-informed by what the official’s constituents
told them during the canvass. Szakos notes that this tactic has helped the organization turn state
legislators around, not by simply lobbying in the state capital, but by meeting legislators on their
constituents’ home turf:
Before, people just never met with their legislators. Now we do 60 constituent
meetings per year with legislators, back in their districts. Not always very big, but
it’s always a multi-constituency gathering. We’ll have labor, environmental
groups, LGBT folks, faith groups there, and it’ll always be cross-racial. With that,
plus having knocked on doors, you can make a difference. The canvassing
operation really lends strength, especially in combination with more focused issue
work, a member and staff presence in the capitol, and policy research from other
states.
VOP works with major statewide organizations on policy reform campaigns through the typical
“give and take” of coalitions. But the organization also lends its staff interns to other groups, to
call on constituents during campaigns and help the groups build capacity and capture important
issue wins. In addition, VOP can periodically mobilize the staff and members of its partner
organizations – going beyond the usual role of a fiscal agent – for its own campaigns. Because
they qualify as “program staff” in VOP’s structure, the organization can pull them in for such
efforts. VOP believes it has pioneered this model of collaboration within Virginia.
The 3 percent administrative fee that accompanies this relationship also means that VOP faces
zero administrative costs for its own core organizing effort – a significant fiscal benefit in the
uncertain world of non-profit financing. The organization is also able to make up for modest
organizing-sector wages by providing significant security for its employees through extensive
health, vacation and professional development benefits, and at least some disability, life and
retirement benefits. Thus, the organization strives to provide for its employees something like the
structure of long-term security that it seeks in the wider society.
The agency partnerships also bring additional organizational benefits. Again, Joe Szakos:
They have balanced out our public profile: VOP’s organizing work involves
raising tension and conflict, which in Virginia is not welcome. VOP’s partners
give us a profile of buying books for kids after Katrina, and sponsoring reading
programs, and setting up websites on recycling. That helps our public profile
while we do our organizing work.
VOP also does extensive political education with its members, pushing them beyond their
comfort zones with particular issues by asking them to see connections between, for example,
poverty and sexual orientation. Each issue on the organization’s agenda is used to deepen
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members’ understanding of the workings of power, locally and statewide. Done systematically,
this has developed a deep reservoir of societal analysis within the organization, thus heightening
the group’s strategic capacity.
VOP’s leaders strive to ensure that each organizational decision contributes toward this
systematic accumulation of capacity. Thus, VOP tries to build the technological infrastructure for
its efforts, not haphazardly but by adding one new element annually: one year a sophisticated
new database; the next year new technology to incorporate that database into VOP’s work,
including text messaging as an organizing tool; another year developing a distribution system for
letters to the editor, op-eds and media releases to all the newspapers in the state; the next year
pooling the resources of 20 allies to develop radio spots related to statewide issue campaigns.
Likewise, when the organization decided it needed to bring young people into its work, it did so
not with a couple of interns – who in past experience too often became a burden to staff and were
unable to really contribute to the work of the organization – but with dozens of interns whose
activities were coordinated initially by the director, enabling them to be directly integrated into
the work of the organization. During the summer of 2008, for example, 50 interns across the
state were part of the door-to-door canvass with members of VOP and its allied partners.
Through the canvass and by working at major community events, they distributed about 300,000
non-partisan voter guides in key legislative districts. The underlying question asked of every
such move is how it might help “build the organization to scale” – that is, contribute to higher
strategic capacity.
Through innovative strategic moves like these, VOP has built its ability to project power in
Virginia, despite a relatively thin institutional base. In this way, VOP (along with its allies) has
gained local victories on a variety of issues, plus statewide victories on affordable housing,
progressive tax reform to help poor Virginians and close tax loopholes for the wealthy, and a
streamlined process to restore the civil rights of non-violent felons. But perhaps more profound
is a cultural shift among its members, a changed sense of efficacy and hope that the organization
has built. The director notes:
But I’d set all [those issue victories] aside. I’d say our greatest victory is that
people now think something can change here, that we really can make change in
this state. Especially after being a new battleground for the presidential campaign,
people can see a connection between our style of organizing and electoral work.
The power of the Christian Coalition and Jerry Falwell and Oliver North is
slipping away – we can really make big changes.... Today, lots of groups are
willing to build and share power in new ways, rather than sitting alone in the
sandbox saying collaboration will just suck away their energy. That took a long
time coming, to change that attitude. It’s all about relationships and power. Now,
folks work on how we can build efforts in different parts of state – with a shared
vision.
The challenge ahead for VOP involves truly “getting to scale” to produce substantial policy
change in Virginia: “To get there, we have to not just raise money, but also find people with
skills.... It’s easy to be busy, but hard to be strategic.... At this stage, it’s not just a matter of
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getting more sponsors for bills, it’s about overcoming the opposition of the big legislative
powers who are clobbering you every time out. We have to be willing to experiment with new
approaches.” To get there, VOP today continues to innovate strategically, getting actively
involved in convening the Virginia C-3 Table, through which progressive organizations with the
same tax status can coordinate their non-partisan electoral work.

PICO California: Strategic success story – and cautionary tale
The PICO National Network sponsors “faith-based community organizing” through the work of
50 organizing federations working in 17 states.5 Each PICO federation provides leadership
training for “local organizing committees” in its sponsoring religious congregations (from 10 to
several dozen such congregations in each federation, with an enormous variety of Christian
denominations and occasional Jewish and other non-Christian congregations participating).
These in turn work to push for public policy to improve the quality of life for residents of poor,
working-class and middle-class communities. They sponsor “political actions” that draw on the
language of sponsoring faith traditions to articulate a vision of a better community, and they ask
political officials to support particular policies in pursuit of that vision. Each congregation
typically works on issues of concern in its local area, and collaborates with the larger federation
to address issues requiring citywide solutions. This model of organizing has often helped
produce policy change regarding city services, parks and recreation, policing, low-income
housing, healthcare, immigration enforcement, and public education. Its most sophisticated
practitioners have helped produce effective teams of leaders in settings with a dearth of effective
representation.
For its first 20 years, the PICO National Network focused almost exclusively on such organizing
at the local level. It is important not to caricature that work: Engaging Americans in public
affairs – especially those who have been apathetic or marginalized by political life – requires
some prospect of making a difference. Influencing local power represents one way of delivering
results. So, like most community organizing efforts, PICO concentrated on influencing decisions
at the neighborhood, city and metropolitan levels. But by the mid-1990s, though many PICO
projects had discovered they could wield real influence over local decisions, such influence was
increasingly inadequate to meet the challenges facing their constituents in working families. In
the context of municipal dependence on monetary flows controlled at the state and federal levels,
local decision-making only kicks in after more substantial decisions have been made; the
decisions that these organizations previously could influence only occurred within constraints
imposed by those higher-level decisions. Thus, influencing state and federal policy became
necessary if PICO leaders were to respond adequately to the challenges they faced. But how
effective could PICO be in these higher-level arenas?
In the mid-1990s, the network decided to use its deep presence in California to experiment with
projecting influence in high-level political arenas. Thus was launched PICO California. The
statewide effort’s subsequent experience offers impressive evidence of success, as well as
5
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important cautionary insights. For my brief purposes here, two kinds of evidence will document
PICO California’s success: specific victories gained at the state level, and comments from key
informants in state government and political society regarding PICO’s influence.
Public education, healthcare and, to a lesser degree, housing policy have been the focus of
PICO’s statewide efforts. Initially, the organization used its pre-existing ties to Gov. Pete Wilson
(established by PICO’s San Diego Organizing Project when Wilson was mayor there) and its
ability to mobilize people from all over California to influence educational policy. Those efforts
began at a 1995 assembly in San Jose where some 1,500 people met the U.S. Secretary of
Education and the state superintendent of schools – demonstrating PICO’s political credentials in
the process – and built gradually to a successful 1998 campaign to convince Wilson and the state
legislature to provide $50 million for after-school programs in poor districts around the state.
The organization also played an important role in placing Proposition 1A on the ballot in 1998.
Proposition 1A, which would provide $9.2 billion for school repair and construction, passed
despite opposition from powerful lobbies, with PICO mobilizing crucial support. In 1999,
building on a successful program forged by PICO’s local Sacramento affiliate, PICO California
worked with legislators and the state education secretary to develop legislation for $15 million in
funding for a parent/teacher home visitation project, extending it to 450 public schools statewide.
This legislation has been renewed annually ever since, with PICO successfully fighting to protect
it during budget-cutting years – particularly in 2002, when in the face of the worst budget crisis
in California history PICO mobilized 3,000 residents to a statewide political action to preserve
funding for vital programs in healthcare, education and housing. The home visitation program
has now received $150 million and is widely hailed for fostering educational success by linking
families more actively to schools and teachers. Finally, in 2004 Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger
signed PICO-sponsored legislation for $30 million in incentive money for local school districts
to build smaller high schools, again building on the work of local affiliates.
Meanwhile, in 2000 PICO California turned its attention to healthcare policy. Its 18 constituent
local organizations brought together 3,000 middle- and low-income residents from around the
state – the most multiracial political gathering of this size in the state capital in years, which
turned the heads of government staffers and politicians. The organization won passage of the
Cedillo-Alarcon Community Clinic Investment Act of 2000, dedicating $30 million to improving
the infrastructure of California health clinics, which serve large numbers of the poor and working
poor. The 2000 action also generated attention to health policy within the administration of Gov.
Gray Davis, whose political platform had included virtually no agenda for health care. Initial
success was limited, but important: The state dropped intrusive quarterly reporting requirements
for MediCal (the state’s version of Medicaid, the federal healthcare program for low-income
people), allowing some half-million families to maintain their health coverage more consistently.
Most substantially, after initial setbacks the California project worked with the heads of both
houses of the state legislature to obtain the state’s commitment to expand health coverage to
some 300,000 working-poor parents. Under sustained political pressure from PICO and its
organizational allies (including AARP, the California Medical Association and the California
Primary Care Association), the federal government agreed to waivers making more than $400
million available for this program, and the state agreed to use its share of tobacco lawsuit
settlements (more than $400 million per year) to support healthcare, adding $200 million to the
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federal funding. Though the budget crisis of 2002 shot down the funding for the program, the
effort placed healthcare on the state’s political agenda. It has remained there, as we shall see.
Finally, when Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger entered office in 2003, PICO built a constructive
political relationship with the new administration by repeatedly bringing leaders from its local
projects to the state capital of Sacramento – including 4,000 people for the 2005 launch of its
children’s healthcare initiative. Throughout Schwarzenegger’s administration, PICO has had
access to the policy-formulation process and appears to have been an important influence on it
(see below).
These are impressive concrete gains, fought for and won in California’s enormous and highly
complex political arena. They suggest that the faith-based community-organizing model can
generate the strategic capacity and mobilizing capacity to generate high-level influence. Before
turning to the more cautionary side of PICO’s recent experience in California – the grinding
struggle to extend the healthcare victories outlined above – we will consider a second kind of
evidence of the organization’s influence: how PICO is perceived by political insiders in the state.
To assess PICO’s profile, Paul Speer and his colleagues from the Department of Human and
Organizational Development at Vanderbilt University interviewed key informants in California
state government and elite political society regarding their perceptions of PICO California.6
Overall, the interviewees expressed a great deal of respect for the organization’s professionalism
and rootedness in “real communities and real people.” As one informant noted, the organization
“has gained recognition in state politics because many representatives, lobbyists, and experts
have begun to recognize the strong relationship PICO California has with the home communities
of its affiliates.” Other statements that capture the tenor of these interviews include:
More than any other organization, the PICO California Project’s leadership is
comprised of representatives of a diverse cross section of the population of
California. Perhaps most importantly, its leadership encompasses a unique
population of the disenfranchised.
Grassroots groups are often unfocused and undisciplined in their work, often have
trouble staying on message....The PICO California Project, however, does not
share any of these weaknesses.
Key strengths of the effort seen by these interviewees included the perception that PICO is
“disciplined, focused, and competent”; has organizational infrastructure at both local and state
levels; represents a diverse constituency; and frames socioeconomic issues from the moral high
ground. Speer’s analysis emphasized PICO’s unique position in California politics, quoting
various interviewees: “The organization’s faith-based orientation made it quite unique in the
6
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power arena of the state capital ... and lent a `moral credibility’ to PICO’s issue work.” Another
informant noted that she had “never seen that kind of sophistication” in a grassroots
organization. Still others called PICO “a bomb exploding the business-as-usual style of politics”;
argued that its work has “resulted in progress [on healthcare] that would have never been made
without the organization”; and said “of all the grassroots organizing groups in California politics,
none are as effective as the PICO California Project.”
According to the Speer report, one interviewee noted:
The organization also enjoys real and powerful connections with legislators and
representatives at the State Capitol. The organization is able to call upon these
connections to put strong pressure on local representatives to address the concerns
of the organization’s leadership. …This kind of political connection has not been
developed by any other grassroots organization working in the State.
Thus, PICO appears to have made a significant impact on the policy process in California,
bringing previously marginalized voices into that process to an extent unmatched in these
political insiders’ experience. As one summarized the organization’s political access: “[PICO]
has a great deal of power and entree, certainly to a greater extent than most organizations.... Even
in critical times when there is a huge crush of demands ... PICO can still get in the door and still
get respected. That’s rare for someone who doesn’t have $100,000 to donate.”
Finally, note that despite fears of some participants at the start of the effort, projecting state-level
power does not appear to have undermined PICO’s local organizing. In the context of building
statewide influence, PICO California expanded from 10 local affiliate organizations in 1993 to
19 such affiliates in 2009, representing more than 350 congregations. PICO argues that this gives
it a presence in more than half of the state’s legislative districts and representation of some
400,000 families affiliated with sponsoring congregations. Indeed, such widespread presence
arguably strengthened local organizing by creating resource flows into which affiliates could tap
by influencing city and county decision-making – particularly as local governments drew on
tobacco settlement money to fund healthcare for working-class residents, and on state affordablehousing money generated through the PICO-supported bond measure to fund local housing
initiatives.
PICO California Executive Director Jim Keddy’s assessment of what PICO California has
accomplished is somewhat more sober. Working with organizers and leaders from throughout
the state, Keddy was the architect of the work throughout the period. From 1998 to 2001, Keddy
said, “We were able to shift pretty significant resources toward our priorities, during a time when
the state had money.... After the dot-com crash of 2002, we got into a situation of playing
defense, trying to protect programs that serve working-class families.” He went on to note that
PICO underwent a great deal of strategic learning in the latter period, regarding the nature of the
taxation system, how the state spends money, and how to run statewide initiatives, which are
crucial in California. In many ways PICO was successful, in the sense that California has not had
the huge cuts in social spending faced by working people in many states. But Keddy observed,
“we want to get out of playing defense, and really play offense again.” By 2006, that was
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happening: PICO played a central role in getting a statewide initiative known as Proposition 86
onto the ballot. The initiative was intended to provide and fund health coverage for 800,000
uninsured children in California. If successful, it would ultimately represent a major expansion
of social provisions to millions of people in the state.7
However, here the harsh realities of political power in America today enter the story, and the
cautionary side of PICO California’s experience comes to the fore. As outlined above, in the last
15 years PICO has built a linked set of local organizations with a statewide reach. Many of them
have strong strategic, cultural and mobilizing capacities. Though others are weaker, the overall
picture that emerges is one of impressive organizing capacity. The project combines an ability to
mobilize several thousand people to statewide or local political actions; a willingness to
collaborate and negotiate constructively with political officials of either party who are willing to
support social policies that address problems raised by PICO’s supporters; the capacity to use a
variety of tactics, from press conferences to statewide ballot initiatives to negotiations with toplevel state officials to mass political actions that support progressive policy goals; and a
sophisticated set of cultural practices to connect political work to the diverse religious
frameworks of its constituents.
Despite these strengths, in 2006 and 2007 PICO California ran up against the powerful barriers
to progressive policy implementation in American politics. The hardball politics of America’s
partisan divide scuttled one attempt: At the end of 2005, Republican Gov. Schwarzenegger had
vetoed a Democratic bill that would have funded an expansion of existing public healthcare
programs. So PICO and its allies turned to the ballot initiative process. Given that California’s
anti-tax Proposition 13 and the anti-government assumptions that exist in American popular
culture together make general tax increases nearly impossible in the state, Proposition 86
proposed to increase the tax on cigarette sales to raise the approximately $400 million per year
needed to provide insurance to uninsured children. That move provoked a massive mobilization
against the measure, with $65 million in funding from tobacco interests. The result: In November
2006, Proposition 86 was defeated, despite polls showing 83 percent of Californians believe all
children should be insured.8 That this defeat, after major organizational investment throughout
2006 by local PICO federations and PICO California, did not lead to organizational
demoralization and demobilization suggests the strength of PICO’s strategic and cultural
capacity. But it was a defeat nonetheless, and a painful one.
PICO remobilized in 2007 to get healthcare funding through the state legislature. It had the
implicit support of the governor: Despite his earlier veto, when Schwarzenegger gave his stateof-the-state address early in the year, he made providing healthcare for all children a centerpiece
of his agenda. Throughout the year, PICO worked with a variety of prominent foundations,
healthcare advocates and labor unions, plus the Republican governor and some Democratic
legislative leaders, seeking to craft a bipartisan bill. By the end of the year, a two-part strategy
7

See Peter Schrag, “The Cost of Good Works in a Bad System” in The Sacramento Bee,
Feb. 1, 2006, p. b7.
8
On the defeat of Proposition 86, see “Insurance for Kids: Back to square one” by Clea
Benson, Sacramento Bee Capitol Bureau, Monday, Nov. 13, 2006.
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for universal coverage had been developed by Schwarzenegger and the Democratic head of the
State Assembly, Rep. Fabian Nuñez. Part one of that strategy was laid out in legislation whose
children’s health provisions were shaped by PICO California; it was passed by the State
Assembly in late 2007.
Part two of the strategy involved a healthcare ballot initiative filed by Schwarzenegger and
Nuñez to create a trust fund to provide health coverage to all of California’s uninsured children
plus a significant portion of uninsured adults (about 3.7 million people). Again, PICO’s political
fingerprints were apparent in the way the initiative was written, in particular in its emphasis on
children. When the governor gave a press conferences promoting the initiative before it was
filed, the children’s provisions it contained were not scheduled to go into effect until July 2010.
Yet by the time the initiative was filed less than a month later, children were at center stage:
Children’s care would begin in July 2009, and $25 million would be available six months before
that to lay local groundwork for the launch. Furthermore, the initiative was written to protect the
children’s healthcare funding even if other elements of the new program were challenged in
court. PICO appears to have played a crucial role in pressing for those changes. After years of
fighting for children’s healthcare, the organization criticized any further delay, even one
proposed by its public allies. As PICO California Executive Director Jim Keddy noted at the
time:
[In December 2007] PICO affiliates around the state were pressuring their
legislators to make sure that children were a top priority in the negotiations over
universal health coverage. I am pleased to report that we accomplished our goals.
Children are a top priority in the initiative filed last week.... [In response to the
governor and speaker’s initial proposal] we indicated that we were not in support
of their plan, and would not participate in the press events. This tension was key
to winning the concessions [in favor of children’s health]. I was called into the
Governor’s office the evening of December 23rd to review a draft version of the
initiative and was pleased to see the $25 million for January to July for the local
children’s health programs and the new start date for the expansion of July 2009.9
Of course, many other organizations and sources of political pressure shared responsibility for
this shift. But it seems fair to credit PICO with a substantial hand in it. Once again, PICO’s
mobilizing capacity and strategic capacity appeared to have overcome a major hurdle, and gotten
healthcare access for nearly four million Californians back on track.
But for the initiative to actually appear before the voters, a final step was required: The
California Senate had to vote to place it on the ballot. At the end of January 2008, the Senate
refused to pass the bill. PICO’s internal analysis is that the bill died as a result of three factors.
The first was ongoing animosity between leaders of the Senate and the Assembly, with the
former feeling they were given little input in the measure’s creation. Second, the bill failed to
gain the support of those arguing for a more radical “single payer” approach, which PICO
9
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believes has little chance of winning the required two-thirds vote in the legislature. Third, once
again tobacco companies and some health insurance companies lobbied strongly against the
measure. Though PICO and its allies considered a grassroots campaign to gather signatures to
get the initiative onto the ballot, they ultimately decided that strategy was not viable for 2008,
given the short timeline to the election. Thus, major healthcare reform in California died in 2008,
killed by a combination of hyper-partisanship, big-money politics, budget constraints and
widespread suspicion of virtually any government-led initiative.10 Even powerful grassroots
organizing efforts must operate on that political terrain, in California and at the national level.
These are the sobering realities of organizing for progressive social change. As Keddy noted in
the days after the California Senate’s action:
There were many people who worked day and night on the policy of this
legislation and interest groups made significant concessions to support it. Most
health plans, for example, (with the exception of Blue Cross) agreed to
“guaranteed issue,” the idea that they would insure people regardless of preexisting conditions. Many in the business community had come to accept the idea
of an employer mandate. At a large healthcare conference this week, healthcare
leaders were angry, depressed and simply astounded by what happened last week.
Yet healthcare rises again as a key issue for progressive policy change. One of the first acts of
Congress and the Obama administration in 2009 was to pass major new funding for children’s
health insurance (SCHIP), and PICO California is working on a major healthcare ballot initiative
for 2010. Grassroots support for healthcare reform is too strong for it to go away. Indeed, Keddy
himself noted a few days later:
The collapse of health reform at the State Capitol in January [2008] and our
inability to place a children’s health measure on the November ballot is obviously
a huge disappointment … we are currently considering keeping the initiative and
fundraising movement alive by looking to place a measure on the next state ballot,
in June or November of 2010. The various supporters we recruited to our cause
over the last month remain willing to fund a children’s health initiative in the
future, and rather than let this work go to waste, we are looking to seize the next
opportunity to bring this issue before voters.
But to win the coming battles for progressive social policy (on healthcare and a host of other
issues, in California and around the country), the experience of PICO California suggests two
necessary ingredients: The most sophisticated community organizing efforts must be supported
with sufficient resources and creativity to continue to build mobilizing and strategic capacity,
and the terrain of American politics – on which those battles will be fought – must shift. This
brief focuses on the former. The latter lies beyond its scope, but I will note that changing the
political terrain will require not only political change but also deep cultural change. The
10
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conservative movement spent years building a national culture of anti-government hegemony
and market supremacy. The demographic and cultural shifts signaled by the Obama phenomenon
hold significant progressive promise, but no evidence exists that deep cultural commitments have
yet coalesced to systematically contest anti-government rhetoric or pro-market populist appeals
(except regarding exorbitant executive pay). Building a different moral-political consensus to
undergird progressive political action will require deep cultural work in all our institutions:
congregations, schools, political parties, and within popular culture. As I have argued elsewhere,
community organizing represents one tool for that kind of cultural work.11
The trajectory of PICO California thus highlights the challenges of projecting power into highlevel political arenas, and demonstrates PICO’s ability to do so. Statewide efforts to address the
healthcare crisis and other issues have also emerged in other states, including efforts by PICO
Colorado and PICO Louisiana. Perhaps, then, projecting national power might be more
promising than it appears. In the next section, I examine “New Voices,” the PICO National
Network’s effort to find out.

11
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National strategic capacity: PICO New Voices
As PICO’s network of federations in cities around the country gained sufficient power to address
local (and sometimes state) issues, they also came to see the limits of that power more clearly:
As long as they had no voice at the national level, the network’s influence would be stunted.
Might the network’s broad base in 17 states, with teams of active members trained for public
leadership in 500 congregations representing some 50 denominational traditions, provide the
foundation for projecting national-level influence? And might the experience of fighting for and
winning policy change at local and statewide levels have produced an appetite for national policy
change? Or would such an effort risk overwhelming local organizing efforts, ultimately
undermining their work?
PICO New Voices came into being between 2002 and 2005, through a gradual process of
convening internal leaders and organizers to discuss the possibilities and risks. To launch New
Voices, PICO leaders and organizers had to deal with significant doubts within their own
federations; to be successful, they will have to overcome significant barriers. As PICO Associate
Director Scott Reed, a key architect of the New Voices effort, suggested in an interview, “Our
leaders increasingly understand the need for the federal-level action, but are constrained by their
own realities and by political realities in Washington, D.C., in bringing it about.”
Elsewhere, I have analyzed how participants are confronting those barriers, and how factors of
organizational structure, leadership, network ties and culture shape the national effort’s strategic
capacity.12 In that study, which was based on the organization’s situation in 2006, I concluded
that PICO’s national effort was especially strong on its deliberative process, organizational
structure, internal networks, and all the cultural factors considered in the discussion of strategic
capacity earlier in this paper. I suggested that the effort was thinner, however, in its reliance on a
narrow flow of resources, a set of leaders with relatively narrow biographies, a thin network of
external alliances, and a limited political repertoire. Overall, that analysis concluded that PICO
New Voices held real promise for strategic efficacy, but also faced great challenges – due both to
its need to diversify its resources, leadership, external alliances and political repertoire, and to
the obstacles inherent in American political life today.
PICO’s experience since 2006 largely confirms that analysis. When Hurricane Katrina hit the
Gulf Coast in mid-2005, the national network had shifted priorities to address the resulting crisis
in Louisiana and elsewhere, pushing for immediate aid to limit the devastation in poor
communities and throughout the region.13 Though in one sense a distraction from the main issue
12
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priorities of the New Voices campaign, the organization adeptly moved to address this major
crisis in one of its core geographic sites – and then pivoted to return to its central emphasis. In
December 2006, New Voices launched an effort to persuade key House and Senate members to
support reauthorization of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) at a level that
would cover 10 million uninsured children throughout the country. In 2006-2007 the national
project repeatedly held press conferences and congressional visits in Washington, D.C., drawing
on its clergy leadership to frame children’s healthcare in moral terms, and receiving extensive
media coverage. More importantly, local PICO-affiliated federations hosted 48 political events
“back home” in member’s congressional districts, striving to create the political will to move
progressive legislation when SCHIP came up for reauthorization at the end of 2007. PICO New
Voices was of course not alone in that effort; a broad coalition of organizations came together to
try to translate broad public support for government-backed healthcare for uninsured children
into federal policy. But PICO New Voices was one of the key parts of that coalition, in particular
in its ability to perform two political tasks crucial to moving legislation: generating grassroots
support from congressmembers’ constituents, and publicly framing the healthcare debate within
the key moral traditions (especially religious traditions) that shape Americans’ perception of the
issue. Thus, within a few years of launching New Voices, the PICO National Network had
learned to coordinate its mobilizing and cultural capacities to play a significant role within a
broad national coalition on healthcare extension.
As the fall 2007 Congressional vote on SCHIP reauthorization approached, it appeared that the
healthcare coalition had successfully generated the strategic capacity to win on one of the more
high-profile and controversial issues of the day: whether the federal government should be more
active in funding healthcare for uninsured Americans. And indeed, Congress voted to reauthorize
SCHIP with an additional $35 billion in funding over five years, while also raising the upper cap
on income that families could earn and still be eligible for SCHIP coverage.
But here again, the constraints of the American political process enter the picture. A president
ideologically committed to limiting the role of government twice vetoed the SCHIP
authorization, driven by opposition to the increased funding and to the higher caps on family
income, and perhaps by the fear that this legislation represented the leading edge of a new
approach to social policy after years of anti-government ideological hegemony. For all its
strength and despite broad support for the measure, the coalition that had brought SCHIP
expansion to the table simply could not generate sufficient congressional support to override
President Bush’s veto. After the veto, the coalition successfully lobbied for renewal of SCHIP at
then-current funding levels through March 2009, which kept the program alive until a new
Congress and president provided significant new funding for children’s health in early 2009. The
PICO National Network was a central player in that final approval, testifying before Congress at
the time of its passage. PICO's Scott Reed also spoke at the March 2009 White House Forum on
Health Reform, called to lay the groundwork for major healthcare legislation; he spoke at a
session attended by 13 members of Congress and moderated by Valerie Jarrett (Senior Advisor
to the President) and Zeke Emanuel (White House Health Care Policy Advisor).
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Some within PICO argue that the SCHIP battle in fact represents a victory. As Jim Keddy has
argued, whereas some ideological opponents of government programs wished to entirely
eliminate SCHIP as unwarranted intrusion of government into the market for healthcare, PICO
helped force its renewal until a day when different political conditions may allow real expansion.
Nevertheless, to have battled so hard and lost on SCHIP expansion was a bitter pill to swallow –
but perhaps not a surprising one. As I argued in my earlier analysis of PICO’s national work:
Powerful constraints rooted in the current political and economic context
apply a fortiori to the New Voices national effort: massive federal deficits,
deep anti-government and anti-tax currents in national culture, and the
hyper-polarization of congressional and presidential political dynamics argue
against any irenic reading of PICO’s national opportunities. To succeed,
New Voices leaders will have to overcome these constraints.
Overcoming such major limitations would be a significant victory, and clearly neither New
Voices nor the rest of the movement for progressive new domestic legislation has achieved it.
Thus, like PICO California, the New Voices effort demonstrates the impressive “scaling up” of
capacity that is possible within the community organizing world – at least where strong
organizing foundations, artful and disciplined leadership, and sufficient resources can be brought
together – but it also demonstrates the enormous political constraints imposed by the political
and cultural status quo of American society. Building on its current capacity, community
organizing can, in conjunction with other efforts, create new possibilities for public policy, and
effectively help implement those that are attainable at the local level. But at the state and national
levels, actually delivering on those possibilities will demand strengthening organizational
capacity and continuing strategic innovation.
In recent years, PICO has broadened its strategic networks, partly through its engagement in the
Katrina recovery but especially through the alliances forged in the healthcare struggle. It has also
secured a deeper resource base (most prominently through major funding from the Sandler
Foundation for its core organizing work) and built up its political repertoire. Though the resumés
of its own national leaders are still somewhat limited, it now draws on the diverse expertise of its
national organizational partners, at least partially overcoming that drawback. Thus, the
organization has moved forward in meeting some of the explicit organizational challenges it
faced even a few years ago. New Voices will continue to require major funding for particular
initiatives and issue campaigns, but the stability of the national organizing effort appears assured.
Winning national victories may also entail dealing with some of the cultural and partisan
assumptions that have emerged in American society in recent years. PICO strives to confront
these assumptions by constructing a culture of sustained public engagement and forging a
centrist coalition around issues that can draw support from both parties and make policy
headway despite partisan polarization. As we have seen, directly confronting the powerful forces
that drive partisan polarization risks failure. But the combination of PICO’s creative cultural
work and strong organizing capacity in local congressional districts may create sufficient
strategic capacity to overcome those risks – if New Voices can continue to strengthen its
strategic capacity and if emergent trends in national politics work in its favor.
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Raising the bar for future generations
This paper has examined strong models of strategic capacity within a handful of organizing
efforts, focusing on exemplars of broader patterns within the more capable sectors of organizing
today. Important strategic capacity exists today within the national-level work of PICO New
Voices and the state-level work of the Virginia Organizing Project, PICO California and PICO
Colorado. Other important efforts include ACORN, SEIU and the broader labor movement, the
recently invigorated Sierra Club, and elements within certain congregation-based organizing
networks (the Industrial Areas Foundation, the Gamaliel Foundation, DART, the InterValley
Project and RCNO). If brought to bear in the high-level political arenas that set the terms for
local organizing efforts, that strategic capacity may make a significant difference in American
politics in the months and years ahead. Some efforts are much further along than others in
entering those higher-level arenas – and in even having the vision or the means to do so. Others
remain mired in what Marshall Ganz has rightly diagnosed as the localist and unimaginative
strategic orientations of community organizing of the past. But strategic leaders within
organizing and its key funding agencies are gradually building a more ambitious vision and the
means to attain it.
More ambiguous is the national economic and political context within which all community
organizing will have to occur in the years ahead. Economically, the tremendous deterioration of
the fiscal situation of both government and private foundations will produce real limitations on
policy options and funding for community organizing. Yet the very depth of the crisis argues for
bold intervention, which may help justify progressive priorities. Politically, the national power
distribution has been partly re-aligned, which appears to have the potential to break the
stranglehold on innovative policy implementation that has been in place in recent years. If that
stranglehold is broken – either through bipartisan cooperation or, more likely, through new
assertiveness by the Obama administration – new political possibilities will open up. Effective
community organizations can insert the power of organized grassroots constituents into those
partially open doors of influence. Groups with the strategic capacity to adapt creatively to this
emerging new political context will have far greater promise than those unable to adapt.
The organizing efforts discussed here are raising the bar for others. They have shown the
strategic capacity to innovate and have made significant gains in influencing high-level political
arenas. Perhaps as importantly, each has had the chutzpah and vision to see beyond the status
quo whereby community-based organizing fought local battles but rarely aspired to greater
power.
Yet none have achieved the level of success they want and that the country needs in order to
more fully deliver on its democratic promise to families on the lower half of the economic
ladder. The fight for influence has been harder, the level of resistance greater and the public
arena less open to influence from below than perhaps any of these leaders anticipated. Today,
even highly sophisticated organizing faces an upstream swim against powerful forces. In such a
setting, organizing may be one critical element in breaking down the logjam on policy, but to
play that role it will have to simultaneously achieve several things:
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Sustain a significant organizing presence both in high-level political arenas (where
victories have greater impact but may take years) and very local arenas (where victories
can occur more regularly and leaders can be formed).
Recruit and develop organizers with the diverse talents and backgrounds needed to
organize effectively and innovate strategically.
Constantly develop new leaders capable of acting confidently in high-level political
arenas.
Constantly build a stronger strategic capacity within their own organizations.
Build partnerships with other organizations and with public officials; these are necessary
for moving from potential strategic capacity into actually formulating, passing and
implementing new public policy.
Link organizing work to deep currents of meaning in American life, through cultural
work within both religious and secular traditions.

These are challenging tasks, but if they can be met, community organizing may be wellpositioned to play a role in redefining the direction of American democracy. If the 2008 elections
are to become more than a temporary partisan shift, progressives must aspire to change the
cultural underpinnings of American politics that have fueled conservative hegemony for 25
years: an anti-government/anti-tax ideology, an implicit if unspoken white backlash, and an
assumption that religious values only motivate commitment to issues of personal morality. The
demographic foundations for such a shift are already in place, with new voters far less inclined to
succumb to “white backlash” or narrowly moralistic political formulations. But such shifts can
only undergird long-term political change if they are consolidated around shared cultural
commitments. Such a change in American political culture would open new possibilities for both
major political parties to address anew the powerful inequalities that undermine the good things
America offers the world. Only ambitious and politically savvy community organizing will be
able to help bring those possibilities to fruition.
The art of strategic funding
If this analysis is correct, the current political moment offers a unique window of opportunity for
foundations and individual funders interested in progressive social policy change. That is, if
political dynamics are indeed shifting in ways that open up national politics to reformist
influence (with ripple effects down to state and local levels) and if today’s stronger community
organizing efforts possess an infrastructure and level of expertise not seen in recent memory,
then progressive social policy reform may be more possible in the coming years than at any time
since the Civil Rights movement. The right kind of targeted funding can contribute powerfully to
capitalizing on this strategic opportunity. But what role can funders best play in the current
context?
The best sources of insight are probably those with substantial experience in funding ambitious
community organizing work in recent years. The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, The
Needmor Fund and the Veatch Program at Shelter Rock have all recently funded innovative
strategic organizing initiatives. The Catholic Campaign for Human Development has almost four
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decades of experience in funding emerging and established organizing efforts in low-income
settings. In recent years, The California Endowment has been the core funder of PICO
California’s healthcare organizing, as well as many other efforts in that state, and the Sandler
Family Supporting Foundation provides major support to the work of the PICO National
Network and the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). Other
funders seeking to invest in the emerging opportunities for progressive community organizing
can learn much from the experience of these funding pioneers (and from dialogue with
organizers themselves).
Beyond this, studies of efforts to project participatory democratic power into high-level political
arenas (by this author and by others) suggest a few lessons that ought to inform funders’
thinking:
1. Fund ambitiously, with accountability: Large-scale impact requires substantial and
sustained funding. Moving issues in high-level political arenas is expensive, often
requiring travel, staffing, polling and the cultivation of political relationships far beyond
that required in local arenas. In making that financial commitment, funders can insist on
knowing what is being done and what is being learned – that is, they can insist that
organizations constantly develop their strategic capacity, while leaving the content of that
capacity to the organizations’ own decision-makers.
2. Fund experience and creativity; foster gradual learning: Success in higher-level arenas
must be founded on solid experience of success in lower-level arenas, but it also requires
creative strategic thinking. Leaders must be willing to try new ideas, evolve tactics to
take advantage of emergent opportunities and counter emergent threats, and learn from
their initial mistakes and successes. Success emerges from an iterative process of
trial/error/success that gradually finds the best approaches in a given political context. Do
not insist on quick success; insist on constant, cumulative reflection and learning.
3. Fund organizations open to collaboration, but do not force it from outside: In complex
political arenas, virtually no political actors are capable of producing policy change on
their own – especially not those organizations constrained by their tax status and
organizational ethos from intervening in clearly partisan ways. Such organizations can be
highly effective, but must work in collaboration with other organizations pursuing the
same objectives. Such collaborative efforts can be built in at least two ways: by working
with organizations doing similar work in different settings – what might be called
“segmented collaboration” (e.g. different community-organizing groups in different parts
of the country educating and organizing on the same issue); or by collaborating with
other organizations doing quite different kinds of work – what might be called
“specialized collaboration” (e.g. a community-organizing group seeking out policy think
tanks, direct-mail operations, individual membership organizations, prominent
spokespersons or religious authorities, labor unions, and political-process experts to
approach policy change from different angles). But forcing collaboration on
unenthusiastic organizations has routinely failed, and which kind of collaborative
relationships are most useful is best left to the judgment of participating organizations
themselves as they learn what they need to win. Be discerning: Organizations that by
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policy, ethos or reputation are unwilling to collaborate may win local victories, but are
unlikely to influence high-level politics over the long run.
4. Fund to nurture ambitious organizing: Visionaries within the organizing world who
aspire to influence higher-level political venues often must swim upstream against inertia
and habits within their own organizations. Vision and capacity for high-level organizing
are unevenly distributed, both across the various “players” in community organizing and
within each organization and network. Whoever you fund will gain influence in their
networks, so choose well.
5. Fund to build local-state-national synergy: A tension exists, and trade-offs may have to
be made, between projecting power into high-level political arenas and sustaining a
vigorous organizing process at its local roots. However, it is possible to manage this
tension by pursuing high-level policy change in ways that create local-level opportunities
to nourish organizing in neighborhoods, communities and metropolitan areas. For
example, new funding for healthcare won by the PICO California effort was channeled to
lower governmental levels, where it was tapped into by PICO’s local federations through
city- and county-level political action. In this way, a far broader base of leaders gained
experience, and local organizations were strengthened by local political wins.
Neither insights from colleagues nor the lessons gleaned from research provide direct answers to
funders wondering who and how to fund in the field of progressive community organizing.
Strategic funding will always be more art than science, in the same way that great architecture is
more art than science. Building an infrastructure of democratic organizing can draw on lessons
from past experience, but ultimately requires initiative, decision-making and risk-taking from
funders willing to invest in new strategic ideas. In discerning the most promising opportunities,
the art of strategic funding will also require discipline, ambition and humility: the discipline to
really learn about the field before investing; the ambition to make a real difference in the policy
decisions that shape the lives of people in struggling communities; and the humility to trust
others’ work even while insisting on scaling up organizing efforts to confront the real challenges
our society faces.
All of this is a tall order, but the rewards are great. Those who find ways to fund a more
grounded, creative and effective form of community organizing may contribute mightily to
breaking the policy logjam in Washington, effectively addressing our urgent social problems,
and renewing the participatory roots of American democracy.
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